Pakistan is approximately 97% Muslim and the remaining 3% are Christian, Hindu, Buddhists or others. The country has suffered chronic sectarian violence against religious and non-religious minorities, with Shia Muslims subjected to the majority of the violence, and many extremely serious incidents against the Christian minority. For individual non-religious persons to speak out is uncommon, but those revealed or alleged to be non-religious tend to provoke swift condemnation.
The legal environment in Pakistan is notably repressive; it has brutal blasphemy laws, systemic and legislative religious discrimination and often allows vigilante violence on religious grounds to occur with impunity.
|Constitution and government||Education and children’s rights||Family, community, society, religious courts and tribunals||Freedom of expression advocacy of humanist values|
Expression of non-religious views is severely persecuted, or is rendered almost impossible by severe social stigma, or is highly likely to be met with hatred or violence
There is a pattern of impunity or collusion in violence by non-state actors against the nonreligious
Government authorities push a socially conservative, religiously or ideologically inspired agenda, without regard to the rights of those with progressive views
There is a religious tax or tithing which is compulsory, or which is state-administered and discriminates by precluding non-religious groups
Countries: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Congo, Republic of the, Djibouti, Ethiopia, France, Iceland, India, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Mali, Mexico, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, São Tomé and Príncipe, South Africa, Sweden, Taiwan, United States of America, Uruguay
Countries: Andorra, Angola, Azerbaijan, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Madagascar, Montenegro, Namibia, South Sudan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam
Countries: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Congo, Republic of the, Dominica, Ecuador, Estonia, France, Ghana, Guatemala, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Republic of, Kosovo, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Micronesia, Monaco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Poland, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, São Tomé and Príncipe, Serbia, Sweden, Taiwan, Uruguay, Venezuela
Countries: Austria, Barbados, Bhutan, Botswana, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lesotho, Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, Seychelles, South Africa, South Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam
Countries: no countries relate to this boundary condition
Countries: no countries relate to this boundary condition
Countries: no countries relate to this boundary condition
This condition is unusual in that it is applied in cases where there is some social discrimination, but it is not pervasive or nationwide. This condition is applied when there is sufficient background evidence to warrant the assertion that discrimination is not anomalous but widespread, and this condition may be applied for example even where if there is no legislative discrimination or where the non-religious may have legal recourse against such discrimination. However, societal discrimination (i.e. discrimination by peers, as opposed to state or legal discrimination) is not easily measured, and for this reason the Report does not currently have similar more severe boundary conditions to capture higher levels of social discrimination per se. In principle these may be introduced in future. However, we consider that countries with actual higher levels of social discrimination against the non-religious will generally already meet other higher level (more severe) boundary conditions under this thematic strand.
Countries: North Korea
Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Bahrain, Belize, Botswana, Cambodia, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malta, Moldova, Palestine, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Togo, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Countries: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belize, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kosovo, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Switzerland, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Countries: Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Fiji, Finland, Germany, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Italy, Kenya, Kiribati, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, New Zealand, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Venezuela
Countries: Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, Democratic Republic of, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Russia, Samoa, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Zambia
Countries: Armenia, Benin, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Republic of the, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, India, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
Countries: Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, India, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kiribati, Korea, Republic of, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nauru, Nepal, Niger, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Turkey, United Kingdom, Vanuatu
This condition is applied where there are miscellaneous indicators that organs of the state offer various forms of support for a religion, or to religion in general over non-religious worldviews, suggesting a preference for those beliefs, or that the organs of that religion are privileged.
Countries: Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Haiti, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Serbia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Zimbabwe
Countries: Albania, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Djibouti, Dominica, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Germany, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Kiribati, Korea, Republic of, Latvia, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Serbia, Singapore, Swaziland, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, Vanuatu
This condition highlights countries where schools subject children to fundamentalist religious instruction with no real opportunity to question fundamentalist tenets, or where lessons routinely encourage hatred (for example religious or ethnic hatred). The wording “significant number of schools” is not given a rigid quantification (sometimes the worst-offending schools are unregistered, illegal, or otherwise uncounted); however the condition is not applied in cases where only a small number of schools meet the description and may be anomalous, as opposed to being indicative of a widespread problem.
Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Ecuador, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Haiti, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Lebanon, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Philippines, Sri Lanka, Uganda, United Kingdom
Countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Hungary, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Oman, Palestine, Paraguay, Qatar, Russia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zimbabwe
Countries: Angola, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Congo, Republic of the, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Ethiopia, Germany, Ghana, Haiti, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Nepal, North Korea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Serbia, Singapore, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia
Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Finland, Georgia, Haiti, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Tunisia, Tuvalu, United Kingdom, Yemen, Zambia
Countries: Argentina, Armenia, Belize, Botswana, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, China, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Oman, Palestine, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Togo, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Countries: Algeria, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Haiti, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Kiribati, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Nigeria, Oman, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Thailand, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Tonga, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States of America, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Countries: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Comoros, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Grenada, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Poland, Qatar, Russia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Countries: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Denmark, Eritrea, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Solomon Islands, Switzerland, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Kingdom
Countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Gambia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen
This condition may apply if specifically religious education, religious materials, or specific religious denominations are so tightly controlled that children are in fact over-protected from exposure to religion and are likely unable to explore or construct their own worldview in accordance with their evolving capacities. This condition helps us to classify states (perhaps with secular constitutions) which have criminalized specifically religious beliefs or practices. This condition is not applied if the restricted beliefs or practices are found to be outlawed due to their being of an extremist variety. While this condition does not directly reflect discrimination against non-religious persons or non-religious ideas, it does represent an overall threat to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; such restrictions could spill over to affect non-religious beliefs later; and they pose a risk of backlash against over-zealous secular authorities or even against non-religious individuals by association.
Countries: Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chad, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Korea, Republic of, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Montenegro, Myanmar (Burma), Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Timor-Leste (East Timor), Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe
The constitution establishes Islam as the state religion. Despite the constitution’s promise of adequate provisions for minorities to practice their religious beliefs freely, many of Pakistan’s laws and policies restrict freedom of religion or belief. The Muslim majority is afforded more protections than the non-religious or minority religious groups. The relatively common sectarian and religiously motivated violence against minorities and individuals in Pakistan often goes unpunished.
Pakistan’s penal code encompasses a number of Islamic legal provisions. The judicial system encompasses several different court systems with overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions that reflect differences in civil, criminal, and Islamic jurisprudence. For certain criminal convictions under the Hudood Ordinances, including those for rape, extramarital sex, alcohol, and gambling, the Sharia bench of the Supreme Court and the FSC serve as appellate courts. The FSC has the power to review, of its own accord, cases in lower courts that relate to Hudood laws and apply to Muslims and non-Muslims.
Government funding is available for Islamic clergy and the building and maintenance of mosques. This funding comes from a 2.5% tithe the state levies on all Sunni Muslims. The funds are re-distributed amongst Sunni mosques, madrasahs, and charities. No other religious or non-religious groups are tithed.
It is a constitutional requirement that the president and prime minister be Muslim. All senior officials, including members of parliament, must swear an oath to protect the country’s Islamic identity and affirm their belief in the finality of the prophet Muhammad. The Interior Ministry has been critical of both secular and religious parties that have protested against this move.
For lawmakers and others to critically discuss the Islamist nature of the law, such as suggesting reform of blasphemy laws (see below) or any broader secular reforms, exposes the critic to potential assassination.
In some places, schools, teachers and students – girls in particular – have frequently been subject to violence and terrorism by the Taliban and other extremist groups. Many children are unable to attend schools, many schools are run down, and the madrasa, which in some areas provide the only available education, are notorious for teaching revisionist history and hatred of non-Islamic religions and people.
In state-run schools, Islamic studies are compulsory for all Muslim students. Whilst non-Muslims are not required by law to take Islamic studies, and are offered ethical studies as an alternative in some schools, in practice no alternative to Islamic studies is usually available and by consequence many non-Muslims are required to take Islamic studies.
A report by International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2014 found that Pakistan’s education system is in crisis. Among various problems including millions of children out of school, the report found that education tended to promote a nationalist worldview excluding minority views and beliefs, and that the madrasa sector flourishes, often as a direct response to poor state provision. Madrasa schools are only nominally regulated, and many of these seminary-type schools propagate “religious extremism and sectarian violence”. The report found that: “the state will have to do far more than just increase the numbers of schools and teachers. Curriculum reform is essential and overdue. Provincial governments must ensure that textbooks and teachers no longer convey an intolerant religious discourse and a distorted narrative, based on hatred of imagined enemies, local and foreign.”
Both the National Commission for Justice and Peace, and the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, have reported the existence of textbooks, educational content and teaching that sought to devalue religious minorities in “an alarming number of schools”. In August 2013, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa education minister said they would return Quranic passages about jihad to the curriculum.
Forced “conversion” to Islam is a serious problem faced by some minorities in the country, usually targeting young women and girls as a way of forcibly marrying them into Muslim families.
On 24 November 2016, the Sindh province assembly enacted the Sindh Criminal Law (Protection of Minorities) Bill, 2015, proposed by a Hindu minority MP, Mr Nand Kumar Goklani, in 2015. This is Pakistan’s first law criminalizing forced conversion, under which perpetrators face a prison term of up to five years.
The government designates religious affiliation on identity documents such as passports and in national identity card applications. Applicants must state their religion when applying for a passport. “No Religion” is not accepted as an answer.
Neither civil nor common law marriage are recognised in Pakistan, and religion predominates over family life and law in a variety of extremely prejudicial ways, including:
The right to freedom of expression, including media freedom, is frequently violated in Pakistan.
Chapter XV of Pakistan’s Penal Code contains a number of sections that institute blasphemy and religious defamation laws: Article 295-A outlaws “deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs”; Article 295-B outlaws the defaming of the Quran; Article 295-C bans the use of insulting remarks about the Prophet; Article 298 prohibits people from saying anything that had the deliberate intent to wound religious feelings; and article 298-B punishes any misuse of epithets, descriptions, or titles reserved for certain holy personages or places.
The blasphemy laws are further bolstered by the Anti-Terrorism Act, which states that any action, including speech, intended to incite religious hatred is punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment. Whilst applicable nationwide, the country’s blasphemy laws are used predominantly in the Punjab province.
Blasphemy laws carry the death penalty or life in prison, and tend to target non-believers, religious minorities and dissenting Muslims. Though there has been an effective moratorium on carrying out the death sentence in recent years, dozens of people at least remain on death row, and furthermore those accused of blasphemy are often murdered before or after any trial takes place (see below).
Notably, for a charge of blasphemy to be made in Pakistan an allegation is all that is required – and it may be highly subjective, since the law does not provide clear guidance on what constitutes a violation. Proof of intent or evidence against the alleged is not necessary and there are no penalties for making false allegations.
Most blasphemy cases are either brought by those wishing to undermine minority groups or by those wishing to eliminate individuals against whom they have a grudge. The mere accusation of blasphemy against someone can result in the accused’s life being endangered.
Mullahs will often come to court to intimidate the judiciary, and obtaining a lawyer to ensure a fair trial is often impossible.
Those accused of blasphemy, and who have been acquitted by the courts, often either flee Pakistan or are assassinated on their release from jail. Clerics and radicals have been found to have brought forward cases of blasphemy after fabricating evidence.
Prosecuting those who commit murder in the name winning retribution against ‘blasphemers’ is also problematized by Islamists and others who intimidate or threaten prosecutors. In 2017 the lead prosecutor of the killers of Mashal Khan (see Highlighted Cases below) was forced to quit reportedly under extreme pressure from the families of the accused.
Blasphemy laws are also used specifically against the minority Ahmadi community. Pakistan’s Penal Code 298 contains anti-Ahmadiyya blasphemy legislation. Whilst Ahmadis have the Quran as their holy book, they can be punished with up to three years in prison by just referring to their faith as Islam. At the end of 2013, a 72-year-old doctor and member of the Ahmadiyya community, Masood Ahmad, was imprisoned for ‘posing as a Muslim’ and heresy after being secretly filmed reading from the Koran at his surgery. In May 2014, A Pakistani mob killed an Ahmadi woman member two of her granddaughters after an Ahmadi was accused of posting blasphemous material on Facebook.
According to the National Commission for Justice and Peace, the authorities prosecuted a total of 1,170 blasphemy cases between 1987 and 2012, with scores of new cases being brought every year. Civil society reports estimate that in 2017 alone at least 50 individuals were imprisoned on charges of blasphemy, with at least 17 facing possible death sentences.
Perhaps the most famous cases of those killed extrajudicially are Salman Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti. The then-governor of Punjab state, Salman Taseer, was gunned down by his own bodyguard, Mumtaz Qadri, in broad daylight at Islamabad’s Kohsar Market on 4 January 4 2011. Qadri said he killed Taseer over what he called the politician’s vocal opposition to blasphemy laws of the country. Two weeks after Taseer was killed, the only Christian minister in the federal cabinet, Shahbaz Bhatti, was gunned down in Islamabad. He too was a critic of the blasphemy laws.
The politicians are only the most high profile of numerous other cases in which individuals are either locked up for many years awaiting various long-drawn out stages of the trial process, or are hurt or killed extrajudicially. The victims frequently include children, minorities, and other vulnerable people.
In June, 2017 Taimoor Raza was accused of making a post that made “derogatory” remarks about the Prophet Mohammad and his family in a way that was interpreted as “sectarian”. According to reports, he was initially arrested after allegedly playing “blasphemous” material on his phone at a bus stop in Bahawalpur. The counter terrorism board found him guilty and has sentenced him to death. Taimoor Raza’s attorney complains that his client is sentenced under two irrelevant and contradictory articles. Rana Amjad Sattar, chief executive of the Humanist Society Pakistan (an IHEU Member Organization), said: “‘Blasphemy’ is just a powerful religious taboo and no government should be enforcing this taboo, still less punishing so-called ‘blasphemers’ with imprisonment or death! Taimoor Raza must be released.”
Human rights activists and politicians in Pakistan banded together to successfully secure the release of a jailed 9-year-old Christian boy and his mother, who could have faced the death penalty after they were accused of burning the Quran. According to the London-based charity British Pakistani Christian Association, 9-year-old Izhan was at school in the town of Quetta on 20 October when he was accused of burning a copy of Islam’s holy book.
In September 2016, Nabeel Chohan, a 16-year-old Christian boy in Pakistan ‘Liked’ an “inappropriate” photograph on Facebook of the Kaaba in Mecca, one of the holiest sites in Islam. He was arrested on blasphemy charges and is awaiting trial. A police official, told the AFP news agency the informant had lodged a complaint over “hurting religious sentiments of Muslims and desecrating the religious place”.
In July 2016 a Hindu named Amar Lal was arrested on “blasphemy” charges, accused of “desecrating” the Quran. Police claims Amar is suffering from psychotic disorder.
On 12 July 2016, police said they were searching for a Christian man, Nadeem Masihm, facing blasphemy charges after a Muslim friend accused him of insulting Islam in a poem. Masihm is alleged to have sent his friend the controversial poem on WhatsApp. The incident occurred in the town of Sara-e-Alamghir in Punjab province. Police said they were having to guard a local church to avoid any violence following the incident.
On 3 June 2016, it was reported that Pakistan’s national TV regulator banned two TV hosts after a discussion about blasphemy and the status of a religious minority sparked controversy. The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority said it banned Hamza Ali Abbasi, one of the country’s biggest TV stars, and Shabbir Abu Talib from hosting their Ramadan-themed shows after receiving over a thousand complaints. Mr. Abbasi asked Islamic scholars during the broadcast on the channel Aaj TV if the state had the right to declare a group of people infidels or non-Muslims. He referred specifically to the Ahmadiyya Muslim community, widely regarded as blasphemers and as non-Muslims.
In January 2016, a 15-year-old boy, Mohammad Anwar, cut off his own hand after being told he was a blasphemer by a local cleric. The boy had raised his hand when the imam asked if anyone did not believe in the prophet, which reportedly the boy misheard. The imam accused him of “blasphemy” in front of the whole congregation, to which the boy responded by going home and cutting off his own hand, before delivering it to the imam on a plate, presumably as a sign of his own contrition for the “blasphemy”. The boy’s self-mutilation was welcomed locally and praised by his own parents.
Shafqat Emmanuel and Shagufta Kausar, from Gojra, Pakistan, were found guilty in January 2016 of allegedly sending a text message which ‘blasphemed’ against the Prophet Mohammed to their local imam, in 2013. The Christian couple sentenced to death over the ‘blasphemous’ texts, despite being illiterate. Their lawyer said the imam was motivated by a personal grudge, and that the SIM card presented in court was bogus. The couple claim they were tortured into confessing to the crime.
In November 2014 a married Christian couple, Sajjad Maseeh (or Shehzad Maish), 27, and Shama Bibi (or Samah), 24, who was pregnant, were attacked by a mob of around 1,200 people after rumors that they had burned verses from the Quran. After their legs were broken to prevent them running, they were set alight and thrown in a kiln. As is often the case, the origin of the rumours have subsequently been linked to an interpersonal conflict, in this case, “revenge for unpaid bills”. The viscerally shocking nature of this case has reverberated through the ‘blasphemy’ law debate in Pakistan, prompting more than usual pressure on police to convict members of the mob who killed them. In November 2016 five of the killers were sentenced to death. An editorial in The Nation broadly welcomed the death sentences for the killers, adding: “Avenging Samah and Shehzad Maish isn’t enough, we must prevent future deaths. The root cause of the problem, the blasphemy laws, are still in place in their nefarious form, as is a politico-religious complex designed to protect them.”
In March 2014, a Christian man from Lahore, Sawan Masih, was convicted of making derogatory remarks against the Prophet Muhammad in a row with a Muslim friend. After the allegations surfaced, hundreds of Muslims attacked the Lahore’s Christian Joseph colony, torching homes. His trial was held in jail due to fears for his safety. Masih was sentenced to death. He argues that the real reason for the blasphemy allegation was a property dispute between him and his friend.
In 2013, a girl from a Christian family, Rimsha Masih, spent several weeks in an adult jail (her family said she was 11 years old) after being accused of ‘blasphemy’ by a local Muslim cleric. Following significant national condemnation by Pakistan’s standards, and international concern, the charges were dropped. Rimsha and members of her family were eventually given refuge in Canada. The cleric, Hafiz Mohammed Khalid Chishti, who had first given police the burned papers as evidence against her, was arrested 1 September 2013, accused by members of his own congregation of desecrating these pages of the Quran himself in order to provoke violence against the local Christian population, a motivation which was in line with some of his previous rhetoric. However, the charges against Khalid Chishti were dropped when witnesses withdrew their accusations against him.
Muhammad Asghar, a British businessman who returned to live in Pakistan in 2010 was arrested for blasphemy and sentenced to death after he wrote letters claiming he was a prophet. Asghar has a history of mental illness, including a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. In September 2014, he was shot in the back by a prison guard. There are fears for his personal safety in prison.
From 2010 onward, the government has been aggressive in its blocking of online “blasphemous” content. For example, perceived blasphemous content on Youtube is blocked by the Pakistani government, and the social-networking site Twitter has also been subject to blocking, as well as complicit in the censoring of material on its platform. In May 2012, Twitter was blocked briefly, and again in September that year. In May 2014, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority requested the removal of some material, much of which mocked Islam and other religions, claiming that it was “blasphemous,” “unethical” and violated Pakistan’s Penal Code. Twitter used its Country Withheld Content tool, which blocks content in a particular nation, to comply and block several dozen Twitter accounts. After international protest, including by the IHEU, in June Twitter restored access to tweets and the accounts it had blocked.
In the past several years there have been a few preliminary efforts by responsible parties to reign in the malign influence of ‘blasphemy’ laws in Pakistan. However, such efforts have often been countered by Islamist voices and by pressure in the opposite direction.
In September 2013, the Council of Islamic Ideology recommended against amending the blasphemy laws to add procedural safeguards, noting situations of misuse or fraud could be penalized through other sections of the Penal Code. In December, the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) stated that the death penalty is the sole appropriate punishment for blasphemy and recommended the removal of life imprisonment as an option when sentencing. The government considered this recommendation, but those found guilty of ‘blasphemy’ seem to enter a permanent holding situation on death row, under a de facto moratorium.
In a rare call for reform by senior authorities, in November 2014 the Lahore High Court released comments on the Asia Bibi case, saying that in their judgement on the case (16th October) they had had no choice but to uphold the earlier death sentence, but called on the government to change the law to implement higher standards of evidence in such cases.
In addition a spate of high-profile blasphemy prosecutions (including Asia Bibi and Muhammad Asghar) as well as extrajudicial killings (including Sajjad Maseeh and Shama Bibi) in the second half of 2014, may have spurred some clerics and political leaders to relatively outspoken criticism of the “misuse” of such laws.
In 2015 some “blasphemy” accused were granted pre-trial bail, and there was political discussion of reviewing the sentences of some long-standing “blasphemy” cases, with individuals in prison facing years-long waits for hearings.
In October 2015, the Supreme Court told the killer of Salman Taseer, his own security guard Mumtaz Qadri, that it was not a legitimate defence of murder that he was enforcing the Islamic norm against “blasphemy” by carrying out the assassination, and that criticising “blasphemy” laws could not itself be construed as “blasphemy”. While a previous judgement had overturned Mumtaz Qadri’s death sentence, the Supreme Court restored the conviction for terrorism on 7 October 2015. The IHEU commented that when the death sentence had earlier been quashed, “We were therefore able to give a qualified welcome for what was a “muddled, but realistic best imitation of justice” available. Today, however, the Supreme Court has upheld the earlier terrorism conviction and thus restored the death sentence. As we said in March , not only are we against capital punishment on principle, the risk here is also that this killer — already regarded as a hero by anti-“blasphemy” zealots — will be elevated to full martyr status.” When Mumtaz Qadri was hanged to death on 29 February 2016 the execution sparked street protests and the police were put on high alert; media was instructed not to dwell on the hanging, presumably for fear of fueling disorder among those who regard Mumtaz Qadri as a hero.
In September 2016, all 46 people accused of attacking a church and the house of Christians in a neighborhood near Lahore’s Sanda police station were cleared. Reports suggest that the mob had attacked the Christian neighborhood after accusing one of the residents of blasphemy. The judge said that as well as police procedural failings, members of the Christian community had not come to court to complain; but advocate Nadim Anthony, a council member of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, said: “How a Christian can appear before Court when he has no protection? Christians and Ahmadis are the most vulnerable segments in our society and avoid recording statements against Muslims because they fear backlash.”
In 2017, the High court in Islamabad asked the Pakistani government to make changes to the laws in order to prevent people from being falsely accused of blasphemy. The judicial request, while not demanding a repeal of the law, asked for the same punishment for those who falsely allege blasphemy as for those who commit the crime. Currently, the false accuser faces imprisonment of up to between two years and life, although such a sentence is rare. This request however has mostly been ignored by Parliament and after a number of similar unsuccessful attempts, there is little optimism for this latest recommendation.
In 2017 a proposal to allow Ahmadiyya to vote without having to declare themselves “non-Muslims” was quickly withdrawn after Islamists vociferously objected. Despite the withdrawal of the plan Tehreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP) (an Islamist political party strongly supportive of the “blasphemy” laws and which appears to be gaining strength following the execution of Mumtaz Qadri) staged a disruptive protest and forced the government to back down. Not only was the proposal to extend Ahmaddiya voting rights withdrawn, but several wider concessions were made by the government as well. These concessions include a national council to counter any “deviant teaching” that Mohammad was not the final prophet and an investigation into whether there was a “conspiracy” to extend voting rights of Ahmadiyya. The agreement made the continued imprisonment in Pakistan of Christian “blasphemer” Asia Bibi a pivotal issue, with new guarantees that she would not be sent abroad.
Asia Bibi was the most prominent ‘blasphemy’ prisoner in recent times. A “lower-caste” Christian farm worker accused of ‘blasphemy’ by neighbours, who had been feuding between families, who objected to her drinking water from a particular well. The charge in 2009 lead initially to a death sentence in 2010, followed by years in indefinite detention, as is the fate of many ‘blasphemy’ convicts in the country.
Asia Bib was eventually released from jail in 2019 after being cleared of charges in October 2018. The court’s decision to drop the blasphemy charges in 2018 was met with violent demonstrations by extremists calling for Asia’s beheading, which paralyzed cities across Pakistan for several days. In order to stop the violence, Imran Khan’s government struck a deal with the protesters, allowing them to petition against the Supreme Court’s judgement. The Supreme Court, however, rejected the challenge to its October ruling.
After her release, Asia Bibi remained under protective custody and was moved to an allegedly ‘secure area’, in a house in the city of Karachi. Asia’s friend, Ahman Hullah, reported that Asia was locked in the house with her husband and that she was prevented from leaving by Pakistani authorities, despite Canada having offered her asylum and the Pakistani authorities having publicly stated that she was free to leave the country.
She eventually was able to leave for Canada in May 2019, thanks to international efforts and European Union mediation, and she is now hoping to move to Europe. While her release comes as some good news, blasphemy law remains unchanged. Asia Bibi herself has attempted to draw attention to the issue, stating that: “There are many other cases where the accused are lying in jail for years and their decision should also be done on merit. The world should listen to them.”
“Blasphemy” accusations in Pakistan are almost always linked to violence and injustice. In 2017 in particular, there were a series of “blasphemy” related incidents that include: enforced disappearances in January, a crackdown on social media including the arrest of several users and the blocking of various websites through the first few months of the year, and the murder of university student Mashal Khan in April (see Highlighted Cases below). On the murder of Mashal Khan, a spokesperson for Atheist and Agnostic Alliance Pakistan (an IHEU Member Organization) said:
“…in a country like Pakistan, when the police stand by as mobs of students who are supposed to be interested in ‘higher learning’ commit this atrocity, it is lawless… There will be no justice while ‘blasphemy’ is a crime and people feel they can get away with murder.”
Two men accused of “atheism” were arrested in March: Abdul Waheed (who has been linked to the pen name Ayaz Nizami) and blogger Rana Noman. The exact accusations remain unclear, but comments by officials and the public suggest that both will be tried as “blasphemy” cases and that they also therefore face possible death sentences.
Pakistan has no specific statutory law that criminalizes apostasy. A 2007 proposed parliamentary bill, which sought to punish male apostates with the death penalty and female apostates with life imprisonment, failed to pass. Nevertheless, some have suggested that the principle that “a lacuna in the statute law was to be filled with reference to Islamic law” could potentially apply to the crime of apostasy.
Despite all the restrictions on free expression, Pakistan’s media is diverse and varied. This notwithstanding, blasphemy laws and other laws are used by the state to justify censorship. Pakistan is also one of the world’s most dangerous places for journalists. They are targeted by non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals, as well as by political, military, and intelligence operatives. In 2016, the International Federation of Journalists reports in 2016 that 102 journalists have been killed in the country since 2005. Impunity in cases concerning murdered journalists remains the norm.
Mashal Khan, a student who referred to himself as a ‘humanist’ on his Facebook page, was murdered by his fellow university students for alleged blasphemy. According to Pakistani media, a large group of students were involved in the attack that occurred on the 13 April 2017 after Khan was accused of posting “blasphemous” content online. Khan had called himself “The Humanist” on his Facebook page. Khan appears to have posted routinely against discrimination and in favour of human dignity. Khan was reportedly shot in the head and then beaten with sticks. Video footage circulated on social media showed his lifeless body being attacked. Police were reportedly present during the attack but claimed they were unable to intervene due to the large number of attackers present. The official police report into Mashal’s death says there is no evidence supporting any blasphemy allegation. 53 suspects went on trial in 2017. Mashal Khan’s father, Iqbal Khan, is reported to have said he rejected any attempt at “reconciliation” by the families of those who killed his son, saying “If someone wants it [reconciliation] then he should watch the videos of the brutal killing of my son.”
In January 2017, several bloggers and activists accused of atheism or blasphemy were forcibly disappeared apparently by state security services. When they were released, some reported having been tortured in detention. As part of the same ‘crackdown’, in March 2017 Abdul Waheed was accused of being behind the pen name “Ayaz Nizami”, and another blogger Rana Noman were arrested and accused of publishing “blasphemy” online. While there were protests to release the ‘disappeared’ activists and bloggers, many others protested against them. Abdul Waheed’s arrest in March was greeted by the trending hashtag “#HangAyazNizami” on social media.
In October 2016, police reportedly registered a case under Section 295-A PPC against a man named only as Aslam alias Saeen Achhu. Aslam is accused of denying “Allah, all the prophets including Holy Prophet Hazrat Muhammad (PBUH), all the holy books, angels and the prayers, fast, Zakat and Haj.” A petitioner is cited as providing recordings of “blasphemous” conversation with Aslam. (As of November 2016 there is very limited information available on this case.)
Fauzia Ilyas is the founder of the Atheist & Agnostic Alliance Pakistan (AAAP), which claims over 3,000 supporters. With strict “blasphemy” and apostasy laws, the very existence of the AAAP appears to have been taken as prima facie evidence of a crime. Custody of Fauzia’s daughter was granted to her ex-husband, a devout Muslim, apparently on the basis of Fauzia having left Islam. In 2015 a Lahore court initiated criminal proceedings against Fauzia and issued an arrest warrant. Fauzia has fled to Netherlands where she is currently seeking asylum, along with her colleague and husband, A. Gilani, a spokesperson for AAAP.
In 2013, Junaid Hafeez, a visiting lecturer of English in Bahauddin Zakaria University (Multan, Punjab province) was accused by a student affiliated with Islami Jamiat Talaba of insulting the Prophet Muhammad on Facebook. Hafeez was arrested and jailed on blasphemy charges. Since June 2014, he has been kept in solitary confinement, in conditions that were described as ‘extreme’ between 2018-2019. His trial, that has involved eight different judges, has been lengthy and has incurred in severe delays since May 2014, following the murder of Junaid’s counsel, Rashid Rehman (see below). Mr Hafeez was expected again in court on 1st October 2019.
Rabia Mehmood, Regional Researcher at Amnesty International, said: “Junaid’s case is a travesty. His lengthy trial has gravely affected his mental and physical health, endangered him and his family, and exemplifies the misuse of Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.” Amnesty has called for all of Junaid’s charges to be dropped and for him to be immediately released.
A large number of international academics has also signed an open letter to Chief Justice of Pakistan Asif Saeed Khosa, asking for a speedy and fair trial for the Pakistani scholar. The letter concludes that “Junaid Hafeez’s trial is not about one individual, it is about the future of academic freedom in Pakistan and fostering an intellectually vibrant culture that values the work of professors like Mr. Hafeez.”
Rashid Rehman, a lawyer who agreed to defend Junaid Hafeez, has since been murdered. Rehman was special coordinator for the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan in Multan. The Hafeez trial had been conducted in jail because of the threat to his life, and Rehman himself received death threats for representing Hafeez and he reported them to the Multan Bar Association, however no measures were taken to provide him with security. His colleagues at the human rights commission also urged the government to provide him with security. In May 2014, two men walked into Rehman’s offices and shot him dead. They have not been caught and activists complain of the government seeking to bury the case.